Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041 fr Recensions (mars 2022) https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1291 Maud Pouradier & Valentin Sonnet (dir.), Style et subjectivité, Caen, Presses Universitaires de Caen, Cahiers de philosophie, no58, 2021, 210 pages. Prix : 15 €. ISBN : 978-2-38185-032-0.     Le cinquante-huitième numéro des Cahiers de philosophie de l’Université de Caen ne manque pas d’ambition en se proposant d’interroger deux concepts aussi vastes et polysémiques que ceux de style et de subjectivité. Loin d’être l’exclusivité du vocable philosophique, ces termes traversent en effet bien d’autres disciplines — littérature, linguistique, psychologie, arts — sans s’absenter jamais du langage courant. De cela, les contributeurs semblent bien conscients. L’amplitude offerte par une telle thématique se retrouve de fait au sein de l’ouvrage — aussi bien par le biais de la diversité des auteurs mobilisés (Dilthey, Husserl, Heidegger, Maldiney, Foucault, Goodman, Cavell, Deleuze ou encore Merleau-Ponty) que par celle des points de vue proposés (philosophie phénoménologique, analytique, existentialiste, métaphysique, peinture, musique, cinéma) — ce qui en fait une lecture riche et stimulante. La présentation sur laquelle s’ouvre l’ouvrage peine d’ailleurs à nouer les deux bouts au terme de plus de vingt pages. Difficile en effet de ne pas se perdre dans un tel dédale… Mais quel plaisir ne trouve-t-on pas souvent au cœur même de l’errance ? Il nous faut d’ailleurs insister sur un point : si une lecture ininterrompue de l’ouvrage suscite immanquablement quelques vertiges et perplexit Thu, 03 Mar 2022 00:00:00 +0100 https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1291 The constitutive function of intentionality in Husserl’s phenomenology https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1284 The article is addressing one of the central but maybe the most ambiguous and multilayered concepts of Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl’s insisting on a form of intentionality that implies not just conscious directedness towards objects, but also a constitutive function of mental acts, led to some serious accusations of his (not only transcendental) idealism and solipsism. Justification of such accusations depends exclusively on whether we understand constitution in an ontological sense, as a creative process which brings worldly entities into being, or in an epistemological sense, as a process which enables us to identify and to interpret a particular givenness as something. In early stages of phenomenology, a so-called “hylomorphic” theory of constitution prevailed, which stated that object of our experience can be present for us only if some sense-data (hyle) is formed in our intentional acts by a meaning-giving component (which Husserl called morphe in his Ideas I). This theory proved to be unsatisfying when Husserl turned to a phenomenological description of temporal objects, discovering that not just objects, but also intentional acts have a distinct temporal structure. However, the analysis of temporal constitution reaches even further, because the idea of the “living present”, and its triadic structure of retention-primal impression-protention, holds the key to an explanation of horizon-intentionality, and offers the answer to an essential transcendental question: How is it possible for us to be aware of the world towards which all of our intentional life is directed, and from which all of the motivation for our actions originates? Thu, 23 Sep 2021 00:00:00 +0200 https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1284 Max Scheler’s Biologievorlesung (1908/09) https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1277 The text, known as Biologievorlesung (1908/09), written by the German phenomenologist Max Scheler appeared in 1993 in volume XIV of the Schelerian Gesammelte Werke by M.S. Frings. It collects the surviving fragments of the notes on the “Gnoseological foundations of biology” elaborated by Scheler for the cycle of lectures, which were held as Privatdozent at the University of Munich in the winter semester of the academic year 1908-1909. Despite being interesting in many respects, the text is still largely unexplored to the very day. In this article I intend to focus on two points: 1) demonstrate the relatively advanced state of progress of the proposal expressed therein by the author compared to his real first phenomenological production between the publication in 1912 of the long article Über Selbsttäuschungen and 1922, the year that marks Scheler's open detachment from the Catholic cultural horizon hitherto embraced, and 2) bring out the systematic unity of the epistemological, ontological and phenomenological themes, articulated here, in a first attempt to develop an ontology of modern science, understood as the product of a vision of a historically located world, through a descriptive analysis of the intentional structures of consciousness implicated in intellectual knowledge. Wed, 15 Sep 2021 00:00:00 +0200 https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1277 Das Subjekt und das Gegebene: Die Frage nach den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung in der Transzendentalphilosophie und in der Phänomenologie https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1269 In this article a comparison is made between the way the conditions of possibility of experience are conceived by Husserl and by Kantian and post-Kantian idealism. I show that — contrary to the latter — Husserl claims that the conditions of possibility of experience lie in the factually given sensuous contents, because sensuous syntheses, which are at the basis of the objectual constitution, depend just on the peculiarity and the course of sensuous contents. Because of a conception of the relation between experience and thought that is antithetical to the idealistic one, Husserl holds that only experienceable (i.e., non-intellectual) forms can produce connections, which are not merely thought, but given in experience. What determines the structure of the world is therefore not the thinking or the understanding, but the sensuous given, which is independent from the subjective thought-activity and factual or contingent, since it cannot be traced back to a priori principles. The world-constitution is consequently an irrational fact, namely something that can be described, but not rationally explained. Mon, 13 Sep 2021 00:00:00 +0200 https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1269 L’infini anthropologique et la phénoménologie: Une réflexion sur la phénoménologie dans l’anthropologie contemporaine https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1263 The paper tries to elucidate some of the implications of using phenomenology in anthropological research. The starting point is Blumenberg’s critique of the Husserlian Anthropologieverbot, against which he proposes a phenomenological anthropology as a “description of man” that can never be completed. This idea resonates with the use of phenomenology in contemporary ethnographic and anthropological works: the problem stems from the “disempowering” effect that this anthropological use has on the phenomenological analytical power. Phenomenology has, from an anthropological point of view, the great advantage of offering a “trans-ontological” perspective able to let the Other speak. Many influential anthropologists cite Merleau-Ponty as a key figure in their approach, as in the case of Csordas’ “embodiment paradigm”, Jackson’s “existential anthropology” or Throop’s idea of an “ethnographic epoché”. This is equally true for two of the key figures of the “Ontological turn”, Descola and Ingold, albeit in radically different ways. On the contrary, it is difficult to find philosophers influenced by “non-philosophical” anthropology. The paper discusses both advantages and limits of phenomenological approaches in anthropology, adopting philosophical and anthropological perspectives, attempting to understand the deeply asymmetrical relation of the two disciplines. Mon, 06 Sep 2021 00:00:00 +0200 https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1263 The Rationalization of Consciousness: A Mereological Reconstruction of Husserl’s Fifth Logical Investigation https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1256 Before engaging with intentionality, the philosopher of mind must consider the intrinsic nature of psychological elements. Conscious states, contrary to ordinary and scientific objects, seem to penetrate each another in such a way that it becomes impossible to enumerate, class or organize through laws the various experiences at stake. In this context, how is a science of consciousness conceivable? How is it possible to apply the epistemological requirements of any science to a domain whose ontological nature contradicts such demands? The paper reconstructs Husserl’s solution to this issue in the Fifth Logical Investigation. I show how his appeal to the mereological framework of the Third Investigation gives him the tools to rationalize the domain of the mind and to establish phenomenology as an authentic science of consciousness. I first demonstrate that the very task of phenomenological investigations is defined in mereological terms. I then reconstruct the issue regarding the inclusion of the intentional object within the act, by exposing the nuances of the Husserlian position in this famous controversy. In a last part, I show how mereological concepts are at the core of the Husserlian reinterpretation of the Brentanian thesis according to which all acts are presentations or based on presentations. Mon, 30 Aug 2021 00:00:00 +0200 https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1256 Recensions (février 2021) https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1248 Vincent Blok, Heidegger’s Concept of Philosophical Method. Innovating Philosophy in the Age of Global Warming, Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy vol. 47, London, Routledge, 2020, 309 pages. ISBN : 9780367418120. Prix : 115 £.     The book raises the question about philosophical method in the age of global warming and climate change. Blok argues that we should ask about a method to access uncorrelated being, in order to understand our position on planet Earth at this crucial moment, where climate change, loss of biodiversity and overpopulation might threaten our survival: The question about our place on Earth leads to reflections on the philosophical method to get access to the Earth, while the question about the method of philosophy leads to reflections on planet Earth as uncorrelated being. (p. 21) He borrows the notion of uncorrelated being from Meillassoux (p. 103-105), who recently introduced this concept in a critique of phenomenology’s analysis of being as being-for-us. The first question is what Earth as uncorrelated being means. Uncorrelated being refers to reality as uncorrelated to man and human thought and action, for instance as it existed before the appearance of man and will eventually continue to exist after man has disappeared. In so far as our understanding of reality always derives from the way we access it through our knowledge of it, reality should be considered correlated being. This epistemological correlation prevents an understanding Mon, 22 Feb 2021 00:00:00 +0100 https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1248 Ist die Wissenschaft das Maß aller Dinge? Eine phänomenologische Kritik an Sellars’ Ansatz https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1244 In view of the incompatibility between scientific and manifest image one can either consider the scientific world as true and the sensuous world as merely subjective or consider the latter as true and the former as a subjective construction. Sellars holds the first position, namely scientific realism. By relying on Husserl, who holds the second position, I try to show that the first position has absurd consequences and is idealistic. For the measure of all things is not science, but perception. Fri, 08 Jan 2021 00:00:00 +0100 https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1244 The Temporality of Maximal Grip: On Pragmatists’ Readings of Merleau-Ponty https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1237 In this article, I will pursue three aims. First, I would like to demonstrate the non-transcendental character of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, namely, his claim that a strict division between a priori and a posteriori is an abstraction that derives from a more primordial unity that is given in our lived experience. I will criticize authors such as H. Dreyfus and T. Carman who treat the body and bodily character of our existence as a classical Kantian a priori that functions as a condition of experience without itself being a part of the experience. The claim I would like to defend in this regard is that reflections on the conditions of our experience must themselves be a part of our experience. The second task is to show how Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of temporality helps him to avoid this strict division between a priori and a posteriori. Based on this, I will elucidate some of the most obscure passages of Phenomenology of Perception. Finally, I will claim that the notion of optimal grip can neither be explained by the reference to our body, as Carman claims, or to brains, organisms and their copings with the environment, as Dreyfus argues. Instead, I will claim that the maximal grip is rather a consolidation or intensification of the temporal ecstasy. Wed, 06 Jan 2021 00:00:00 +0100 https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1237 A Phenomenological Reading of the Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1229 The articles provides a phenomenological reading of the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics and its answer to the measurement problem, or the question of “why only one of a wave function’s probable values is observed when the system is measured.” Transcendental-phenomenological and hermeneutic-phenomenological approaches are employed. The project comprises four parts. Parts one and two review MWI and the standard (Copenhagen) interpretation of quantum mechanics. Part three reviews the phenomenologies. Part four deconstructs the hermeneutics of MWI. It agrees with the confidence the theory derives from its (1) unforgiving appropriation of the Schrödinger equation and (2) association of branching universes with the evolution of the wave function insofar as that understanding comes from the formalism itself. Part four also reveals the hermeneutical shortcomings of the standard interpretation. Fri, 30 Oct 2020 00:00:00 +0100 https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1229